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Many economists believe that an efficient financial
industry is central to economic development. While
this conjecture dates back at least to Schumpeter,
economists have only relatively recently taken up
the systematic study of the impact of finance on eco-
nomic growth. Starting with King and Levine’s sem-
inal paper (1993), a large number of studies have
documented strong positive correlations between fi-
nancial development, measured by the size of the fi-
nancial sector, and growth and economic develop-
ment. While these cross-country results are striking-
ly robust and consistent, they tell us little about the
exact micro channels though which a more devel-
oped financial industry promotes growth.
In Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2005), we under-
took such a study of the micro channels by looking at
the impact of financial market deregulation on the
allocation of credit across firms, firms’ behavior and
product market dynamics. In particular, we analyzed
the French banking deregulation in the mid-1980s.
The French banking deregulation drastically re-
duced government interventions in banks’ lending
decisions, almost entirely abolished subsidized bank
loans and allowed French banks to compete more
freely in the credit market.In addition,several state-
owned banks were privatized in the mid-1980s.
According to most observers, the main effects of the
reform were to move from a centrally-planned to
market-based capital allocation, to decentralize the
decision-making process on loan amounts and inter-
est rates, and to introduce a stronger for-profit mo-
tive among banks.
While our analysis was restricted to a single country,
the scope of regulations in place in France prior to
the reform matches the experience of many other
countries with regulated banking sectors. In this re-
gard,the French reform is quite representative of the
multiple changes many other countries would have
to implement to liberalize their banking sector.
Our focus on France was also motivated by the
availability of comprehensive and very detailed
firm-level accounting data for this country. While
most commonly used international firm-level data
sets cover only publicly traded firms, the data used
in this paper includes both private and publicly trad-
ed firms. The coverage of private firms was central
to our analysis.First,since these firms typically have
access to few other sources of external finance be-
sides bank loans, they may be most affected by any
changes in the banking sector. Second, and equally
important, these firms represent a very large frac-
tion of overall economic activity, making their cov-
erage in the data necessary to any study on the im-
pact of the banking reform on industry structure
and dynamics.
While the French banking deregulation constituted
an economy-wide shock, we isolated its effect on firm
behavior and product market dynamics by studying
differential changes post-reform across sectors that
were more or less reliant on bank finance prior to the
reform.The identifying assumption at the basis of this
empirical strategy is that industries that were more fi-
nancially dependent on banks prior to the reform
should be more affected by the deregulation. In prac-
tice,we also assessed the robustness of our findings by
using a US-based measure of external financing de-
pendence (à la Rajan and Zingales 1998) as an alter-
native source of cross-sector variation in the strength
of exposure to the banking reform.
Our findings, which are summarized below, are con-
sistent with a model where distortions in bank lend-
ing create artificial barriers to entry in the real sec-
tors of the economy. New entrants may be discour-
aged by the easy access to cheap credit for incum-
bent firms. Once banks become less willing to pro-
vide such (cheap) credit to poorly performing firms,
prospective new entrants find it more attractive to
come in and compete with incumbents.A more effi-
cient banking sector therefore appears to play an im-
portant role in fostering a Schumpeterian “creative
destruction” process that has been theoretically, and
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Such evidence of distortions in bank lending being as-
sociated with relative sclerosis and lower restructur-
ing activity in the real sectors of the economy is rem-
iniscent of Caballero, Hoshi and Kahyap’s discussion
(2003) of the role Japanese banks have played in the
slowdown of the Japanese economy over the last
decade.Our findings also complement recent work by
Black and Strahan (2002) and Cetorelli and Strahan
(2004) who study changes in industry-level entry rate,
number and size distribution of firms in the context of
the US interstate banking deregulation. One major
difference between these papers and our study (in ad-
dition to the obvious focus on a different set of re-
forms) is our access to firm-level data. This data al-
lows us not only to look at restructuring activities at
the firm level but also to study the reallocation of cap-
ital across firms within industries.
The French banking reforms of the mid-1980s
After World War II,the French financial sector came
under the centralized control of the Treasury, whose
general aim was to channel savings and deposits into
priority industries. To control the credit market, the
Treasury set up a deposit network, consisting of sav-
ings banks, the postal checking system, the Bank of
Foreign Trade,and four large cooperative banks.This
network had privileged access to some deposits and
the bond market, and a monopoly over the distribu-
tion of subsidized loans allocated by the Treasury.
Increased governmental control over savings collec-
tion and use was also achieved through the national-
ization of some of the biggest banks.
The economic turmoil after the 1974 oil shock fur-
ther strengthened bureaucratization and state in-
volvement in the banking sector. The government
had to balance conflicting objectives:limiting money
growth to stabilize the Franc’s parity with the Deut-
sche mark while stimulating credit and investment.
This was implemented through the “encadrement du
crédit” program, which consisted in setting monthly
ceilings on credit growth for each bank individually.
A direct consequence of the “encadrement du cred-
it” was to further strengthen the relative importance
of subsidized loans and government control over
lending decisions.By 1979,subsidized loans amount-
ed to nearly half of all new loans granted to the pri-
vate sector.In May 1981,a new socialist government
was elected:fiscal policy became more expansionary,
and a further nationalization of the banking sector
was implemented. The Treasury also increased the
pressure on state-owned banks to bail out failing in-
dustrial groups. The number of different loan subsi-
dization programs increased dramatically, as the
Treasury focused more and more on “job preserva-
tion” and preventing the shut down of poorly per-
forming firms.As a result, the credit market became
even more opaque, supporting more than 200 differ-
ent interest rates for different loan subsidization
programs.
The expected benefits from an increased centraliza-
tion of the banking system did not pan out.In the fall
of 1984, the socialist government announced a dras-
tic reversal of policy. The goal was to transform the
financial system into a decentralized credit market,
where interest rates would be used to match the sup-
ply and demand of capital for each type of project.
More specifically, three sets of reforms of the bank-
ing industry took place in 1985.
First, starting in 1985, most subsidized loans were
eliminated.Also, the distribution of these remaining
subsidized loans was no longer the monopoly of the
Treasury-controlled deposit network,which improved
transparency and competition on the lending market.
Second, the “encadrement du credit” was abolished
in 1985 and capital flows in the economy became
much more determined by market forces. Between
1985 and 1987, credit growth limits were gradually
removed and replaced by a system of reserve re-
quirement against deposits. Monetary policy was
now conducted through interest rates on the money
market and legal reserve requirements instead of
quantity controls. Resources became much more
available to expanding private banks. The money
market was also reformed to stimulate inter-bank
lending: private banks could borrow more funds
from the Treasury network, which now had little use
for them. In addition, the system of capital controls,
strengthened in 1981 to defend the Franc, was pro-
gressively eliminated through a string of reforms
ending in 1990 (Naouri (1986).
Third, market conditions became more transparent
and conducive to fair competition.The 1985 Banking
Act partially unified a myriad of banking regula-
tions, and progressively also eliminated subsidized
loans. Partial monopolies over deposits and lending
enjoyed by some banks were progressively disman-
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tled. Banks also faced more competition from other
providers of external finance, as firms’ access to the
bond and equity market was facilitated.1 Last, with
the disappearance of subsidized credit,private banks
no longer faced the unfair competition from the
members of the Treasury Network.
Finally, a number of banks were privatized in the
1986–88 period (about 10 percent of the banks and
20 percent of the banking assets). Most industry ob-
servers believe, however, that the other regulatory
changes we described above were more important in
reforming the French banking industry in the mid-
1980s than this partial privatization effort.Part of the
rationale driving this belief was that about half of the
bank assets that were privatized in the mid-1980s
had just been nationalized in 1982.
The widely (at least anecdotally) discussed conse-
quence of the reform was a change in banks’ behav-
ior. The reforms signalled that the Treasury was will-
ing to let market forces shape the credit market land-
scape for the long run. These new conditions forced
banks to change their lending practices and restruc-
ture internally,in part with the help of the diffusion of
new technologies.A survey conducted in 1985 among
French bankers showed drastic changes in attitudes
about the internal management of banks (Rémy and
Sergent 1986). According to the survey, the focus of
bank managers was increasingly on reducing costs,
controlling risks and introducing tighter performance
monitoring. The greater competitive pressures were
most intensely felt by banks in the Treasury network,
as these banks had lost their privileged access to de-
posits and loan markets.The Treasury network’s share
in all deposits decreased by 28 percent between 1985
and 1990,and its share of loans went down by some 25
percent (Plihon 1995).
Data
The firm- and industry-level data
sets used in this study were based
on accounting information avail-
able for all French firms, public or private, whose an-
nual sales exceeded EUR 100,000 in the service sec-
tor and EUR 200,000 in other sectors.This accounting
data was extracted from the tax files used by the
Ministry of Finance for corporate tax collection pur-
poses. French firms above these thresholds are re-
quired by tax authorities to fill in a detailed balance
sheet and profit statement. Also included in the tax
files is a four-digit industry classification code that is
very similar to the SIC coding system in the US In ad-
dition, the data also contains reliable firm-level em-
ployment figures that have been cross-checked with
information from employer labor tax reports.
Individual firms can be tracked over time by the use
of unique identifiers, which allows for the construc-
tion of a panel data set.We ended up with a data set
of about 350,000 firm-year observations, which corre-
sponds to about 15,000 firms per year. We excluded
firms in the financial sectors from the sample (bank-
ing and insurance industries), since standard account-
ing measures are less meaningful in this industry.
Changes in financial structure and bank lending
practices
In aggregate, the level of indebtedness of French
firms went down dramatically in the mid-1980s. The
ratio of total debt to assets was very high in the ear-
ly 1980s, around 70 percent. Two years after the re-
forms, this ratio went down by 20 percentage points
and remained stable around 50 percent over the
1986 to 1996 period (Figure).
These aggregate figures conceal a sharp contrast be-
tween bank dependent and non- bank dependent
firms. As it turns out, firms in more bank-dependent
sectors display larger changes in capital structure
1 Many reforms encouraging stock mar-
ket finance and participation were under-
taken in the mid-1980s. Among the
prominent ones, in 1986, the monopoly of
the Paris brokers was dismantled; be-
tween 1984 and 1990, capital controls
were progressively removed; in 1986, the
French stock market was among the first
to become electronic. Tax breaks for
stock market investment, simplifications
of procedures for bond and equity issues
were introduced at various points in the
mid-1980s.post-deregulation. They experience a larger drop in
debt post-reform,but this drop in debt finance is only
partly compensated by an increase in equity finance.
The gap is filled with trade credit, which increases
more for firms in bank dependent sectors. The effect
of the banking reform is also reflected in an increase
in the cost of capital in the more bank-dependent sec-
tors.Furthermore,the largest changes in capital struc-
ture occur among the worst performing firms.
While consistent with the idea that banks are becom-
ing more selective in their lending behaviour, these
results could however also be driven by changes in the
demand for bank capital. Due to the increase in the
cost of capital (the mid-1980s where times of sharp
monetary tightening and rise in real interest rates),
firms might have been optimally restructuring their fi-
nancing by relying less on bank loans.
To alleviate this concern and understand in more de-
tail whether and how banks are changing their lend-
ing behavior after the reform, we looked at the cor-
relation between new net bank loans and shocks to
firm performance.The hypothesis we investigated is
that banks were more willing to “bail out” poorly
performing firms prior to the reform and that this
behavior was dampened after the reform.Indeed,we
found that in bank dependent industries, the ability
of firms with a sudden drop in performance to raise
debt was significantly weakened, in particular for
structurally weaker firms. This is consistent with
banks becoming less inclined to bail out poorly per-
forming firms after the deregulation.
Last, we analyzed whether, conditional on getting
new bank loans, firms were more likely to improve
their performance after the reform. Reduced distor-
tion in lending and subsequent improvement in
banks’ monitoring and screening abilities should re-
duce the provision of credit to firms that will subse-
quently perform poorly.Again,we found that getting
more bank credit became more closely tied to subse-
quent good performance after the reform, in partic-
ular in more bank-dependent industries.This is con-
sistent with banks making much more use of their
soft information to grant loans.
Real effects of banking reforms
The previous section showed that the deregulation
significantly changed the incentives of banks and led
to stricter lending practices post-reform.We then an-
alyzed whether this generated pressures on firms to
engage in more cost-cutting and restructuring activi-
ties. Such a response would be expected if firms face
stronger incentives to strengthen their credit rating.
We found that, in the bank-dependent sectors, firms
experience slower than average wage growth, invest
less and outsource more post-reform.It is interesting
to note that these evolutions are even more pro-
nounced among worse performing firms.
Second, we investigated the hypothesis that the
banking reform improved the dynamics and compet-
itiveness of product markets. Our first approach was
to look at entry and exit rates in various industries.
We found that bank dependent industries experi-
ence a larger increase in the entry and exit rates of
firms after the reform.This is consistent with the fact
that changes in bank lending practices have in-
creased the rate of turnover within industries. Both
creations and destructions have increased.
If increased reallocation rates are indeed sympto-
matic of more dynamic and competitive industry
structures, we might also expect market concentra-
tion to decrease after the banking reform, especially
in the more bank dependent sectors. We found this
to be the case in our data.
We then asked more directly whether credit alloca-
tion between firms improved during that period. We
found two pieces of evidence that support this view.
First, badly performing firms were more likely to exit
their industry after the reforms than before.This was
especially acute in bank dependent industries. This
first point is consistent with capital being “with-
drawn” sooner from worse performers. Secondly, we
found that the best performing firms tend to access
larger market shares after the deregulation, in partic-
ular in bank dependent industries. This last point is
consistent with relatively more capital being allocated
to better performers.
Finally, evidence of increased competition and im-
proved allocative efficiency led us to look at several
measures of efficiency and cost structure at the in-
dustry level. We found that bank dependent indus-
tries experience a sharper decline in labor costs after
the deregulation,as well as stronger increases in em-
ployment and labor productivity.
Conclusion
Overall, our findings suggest that a well-functioning
banking sector plays an important role in fostering a
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Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. The
distortions in the banking sector prior to the reforms
may have created artificial barriers to entry for new
firms by unduly protecting incumbents and thereby
dampening the efficiency-inducing effects typically
associated with a more competitive environment.
Our analysis documents a novel multiplier effect
that works through the impact of bank lending on
product market dynamics.
In the context of the current policy debate, the
French reforms provide a template for a successful
multi-tiered deregulation of the banking industry.
Contrary to many other episodes of bank deregula-
tion, the French reforms relied on a combination of
increased competition, abolishing interest rate tar-
gets and directed credit,simplification of regulations
and elimination of bank subsidies. Ultimately, these
reforms led to a systematic change in the structure
and efficiency of the banking system.We conjecture
that such thorough reforms may lead to more sus-
tained change than many other recent episodes of
banking reforms that relied mainly on bank privati-
zations without improving any of the other structur-
al dimensions of the banking industry.
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